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Abstract
Comparing labor markets of the United States and Germany over the period 1980 − 2004
uncovers three stylized differences: (1) transition rates from unemployment to employment (UE)
were lower by a factor of 5 and inflow rates from employment to unemployment (EU) were lower
by a factor of 4 in Germany. (2) The volatility of the UE rate was equal but the EU rate was
2.3 times more volatile in Germany. (3) In Germany EU flows contributed 60 − 70% to the
unemployment volatility while in the U.S. they contributed only 30− 40%. We show that these
differences can be largely explained by a single factor, namely a lower efficiency in matching
unemployed workers to open positions in Germany. Alternative explanations like employment
protection, the benefit system, union power, or rigid earnings are likely not the main driving
force for the cross-country difference. The lower matching efficiency leads to a substantial prop-
agation of shocks. After an adverse shock peak unemployment is reached after 3 quarters in the
United States but only after 9 quarters in Germany.
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1 Introduction
Compared to the United States the European labor market over the period from 1980 − 2004
was characterized by high unemployment rates and a sluggish response to shocks. For example,
Germany displayed a prolonged period of high unemployment rates in the aftermath of the large oil
price shocks, while the U.S. at that time recovered fairly quickly. We document in this paper three
important cross-country differences comparing U.S. and German labor market flows: the transition
rate from unemployment to employment (UE rate) is lower by a factor of 5 and inflow rates from
employment to unemployment (EU rate) are lower by a factor of 4. Second, while (log) UE rates
are as volatile, the volatility of the (log) EU rate is 2.3 times larger in Germany compared to the
United States. Third, if we decompose the unemployment rate volatility into contributions of EU
and UE flows, we find that in Germany the EU flows dominate and account for 60 − 70% of the
unemployment volatility, while in the U.S. they account for only 30− 40%.1
In this paper we propose an explanation for all three differences that is based on a common source,
a lower efficiency in matching unemployed workers to open positions in Germany. We show that the
empirical cross country comparison offers identification restrictions that can be used to disentangle
our explanation from prominent alternatives that have been proposed in the literature to rationalize
either the lower average transition rates across country or the differences in the volatilities. To our
knowledge our paper is the first to simultaneously look at salient labor market features across the
two countries both in the mean rates and the business cycle dynamics and to link them to structural
differences in a common framework.
For this purpose, we develop a simple labor market search and matching model with endogenous
separations. We adapt the model to study business cycles in a similar fashion as den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000) and Ramey (2008). We derive simple closed form solutions for the second
moments, so that we can analytically characterize the implications of institutional changes on the
reaction to business cycle shocks. To study the different explanations in a unified framework we
allow for worker and firm specific human capital accumulation, persistent idiosyncratic shocks as
in Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas (2010) and tenure-dependent firing taxes.
A lower efficiency in the matching process in Germany relative to the U.S. leads to a decline
in the frequency of UE transitions due to an effective increase in the cost of creating an open
position. Simultaneously the average match surplus increases due to a deterioration of the outside
opportunities of employed workers induced by the longer search duration. The increase in the
average match surplus makes is less likely that negative idiosyncratic shocks destroy a match, so
the frequency of transitions from employment into unemployment declines. However, differences in
matching efficiency not only influence average transition rates. The increase in the average surplus
makes German workers more sensitive to business cycle shocks.
1For the U.S. Hall (2005) and Shimer (2007) emphasizes the importance of the UE flows in understanding labor
market dynamics while Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) focus more on the EU flows.
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Consider a German worker at the beginning of a boom. In case she separates, she has to search
longer to find a new match compared to a U.S. worker due to the lower average UE rate. She
would miss a larger fraction of the most profitable time of being employed. This will make her
more reluctant to separate. Similarly, at the onset of a recession the German worker is more willing
to separate because she will only miss the least profitable time of being employed while searching
for a job. As a result, the German EU rate decreases more strongly in booms and increases more
strongly in recessions, i.e. it is more volatile. The EU rate volatility is driven by the absolute
change in the surplus of a match while the UE rate volatility is driven by the relative change of the
surplus to its long run average. This remains largely unaffected due to the simultaneous increase
in the average surplus and the increase in the sensitivity of the surplus to shocks. Hence, the
contribution of the EU rate in the unemployment volatility increases. A lower matching efficiency
can therefore explain both the difference in average transition rates as well as the differences in the
second moments between the two countries.
We consider four alternative explanations and show that these cannot explain all three cross-
country differences at the same time. First, explaining the lower UE rates in Germany by a
more benevolent unemployment insurance system, larger firing taxes and/or an increase in micro-
economic turbulence Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008); Wasmer (2006) will lower the average match
surplus and increase the outflow volatility by more than the inflow volatility, inconsistent with our
empirical facts. The second alternative, we consider, is a stronger bargaining position of the worker
in Germany possibly induced by the employment protection legislation Blanchard and Portugal
(2001). This can explain the lower UE rate but not the larger EU rate volatility. We show that
at the Hosios condition Hosios (1990) both the average surplus and, as a consequence, the EU
rate volatility are minimized. A deviation from the Hosios condition is quantitatively too small to
jointly account for the lower UE rates and the large differences in the volatilities we observe in the
data. Third, we consider differences in firing taxes between low and high tenured worker Bentolila,
Cahuc, Dolado, and Barbanchon (2010); Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas (2010). Yet, these lead to
an increase in the UE rate volatility and to inconsistencies in the tenure pattern of the transition
rates which we document empirically. Fourth, explanations based on rigidities in the wage setting
process Shimer (2010); Elsby and Michaels (2010) affect, in models with endogenous destruction,
the EU rate and the UE rate volatility symmetrically, leaving the contribution of inflows to the
unemployment volatility unaffected, again inconsistent with the empirical facts.
We then show that a different efficiency in the matching process matters for the transmission of
business cycle shocks. In our quantitative model, estimated to reproduce the empirical differences
across both labor markets, an adverse shock hitting the U.S. economy leads to a peak in the
unemployment rate after 3 quarters and levels off fairly quickly afterwards. In contrast, the German
unemployment rate peaks 9 quarters after the initial shock and even five years later the deviation
of the unemployment rate from its long-run trend is still twice as large in Germany relative to the
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United States.
The paper is related to the growing body of literature studying the European ins and outs of
unemployment Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008); Pissarides (2009) based on micro-data and Elsby,
Hobijn, and Sahin (2010) using aggregate OECD data. We provide a detailed account on the
”ins and outs” for Germany using a large micro data set on employment histories.2 We extend
the unemployment volatility decomposition developed in Fujita and Ramey (2005) and Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2008) to a three state, six transition rate decomposition to particularly control for
flows in and out of inactivity. We provide new evidence on the transition rates by tenure to shed
light on the impact of differential firing taxes and the skill accumulation process. Finally we give a
complete account on the earning dynamics in Germany, controlling for selection effects using various
methods proposed in Bils (1985), Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) and Haefke, Sonntag, and van
Rens (2007) to empirically assess the possible importance of wage rigidities across countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 documents labor market facts for
Germany, section 3 develops the model, section 4 characterizes the results, extensions are in section
5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Data description
Our dataset is the IAB3 employment panel that comprises a 2% representative sample taken from
the German social security and unemployment records for the period 1980 − 2004. The sample
contains employees that are covered by the compulsory German social security system, and excludes
self-employed and civil servants (’Beamte’). It covers about 80% of Germany’s labor force. Since
the East German labor market was subject to additional regulations and restructuring after the
reunification, we exclude all persons with employment spells in East Germany from our sample.4
For each worker in the sample we observe the entire employment history (social security status) on
a daily basis. We choose as our basic period length one month and construct monthly employment
2Burda and Wyplosz (1994) summarize evidence on average transition rates for Europe. There are two other
studies on worker flows using the IAB in Germany that show a limited amount of overlap with our results. Bachmann
(2005) uses a slightly different concept to measure worker flows. He measures worker flows on a monthly frequency
but focuses for the dynamics at an annual frequency. However, his results regarding average transition rates are
consistent with our findings. Very recently Gartner, Merkl, and Rothe (2009) also report some basic facts but use
different definitions for labor market states, for example they do not control for inactivity, and work with a quarterly
aggregation so that their results are not comparable to our findings.
3This study uses the factually anonymous BA-Employment Panel (Years 1975− 2004). Data access was provided
via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency
(BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
4We do a first step sample selection where we remove very few individuals with missing observations. Details on
this step and further information on the data set can be found in the appendix.
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histories from the daily data.5 We account explicitly for periods of inactivity and transitions out
of the labor force, e.g. (early) retirement or maternity leave.
Aggregate data for Germany are from the German statistical office (’Statistische Bundesamt’). The
official unemployment rate is from the German Employment Agency (’Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit’).6
The data for the U.S. is from the BLS for the aggregate time series and from Shimer (2007) for the
labor market transition rates. The numbers on employer-to-employer transitions are from Fallick
and Fleischman (2004). In the decomposition analysis of the unemployment volatility we use in
addition data from Fujita and Ramey (2009).
2.2 Labor market flows
Following the work of Shimer (2005) for the United States and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) for
several European countries this section provides a comprehensive analysis of the ‘ins and outs’ of
unemployment for Germany and compares the results to existing evidence for the United States.7
Table 1 summarizes our findings and presents a cross-country comparison along three dimensions:
aggregate business cycle fluctuations, mean labor market transition rates, and volatilities of the
transition rates.8 Two facts are striking, while the aggregate business cycle fluctuations look very
much alike (see left part of the table), the transition rates in the right part of the table uncover a
labor market that is substantially different both in mean rates and in volatilities (see right part of
the table).
More specifically, measures of aggregate economic activity GDP, labor productivity, and earnings
have similar volatilities in both countries. The aggregate measures of the labor market are slightly
more volatile in Germany compared to the U.S.. The unemployment rate is 1.2 times as volatile
and vacancies9 are 1.6 times as volatile. Correlations with GDP have the same sign and similar
magnitudes across the two countries. Additionally the Beveridge curve, the correlation between
unemployment rates and vacancies, is strongly negative in Germany (correlation −0.85) and the
U.S. (correlation −0.91). Altogether, the picture that emerges on an aggregate level is fairly similar.
This changes once we look at labor market transition rates and volatilities in the right part of the
table. We find average rates that are substantially lower in Germany. The EU rate is lower by a
factor of 4 and the EE and EN rates differ by a factor of approximately 3. The UE rate is also
5In the appendix we describe in detail how we construct the employment histories and labor market states.
Bachmann (2005) studies an earlier version of our dataset covering the period 1975 − 2001 and applies a different
approach to measure labor market transition rates. His results account for all transitions within a month but are
virtually unchanged compared to our findings.
6Further details especially on the adjustment for the German reunification can be found in the appendix.
7The data discussed here refers to all workers and an online appendix to this paper provides an extended analysis
where we separate worker flows based on sex and education.
8We do not report NU and NE transition rates because we do not observe the universe of all non-employed so that
transition rates can not be computed. The online appendix reports the correlation and volatilities for these flows.
9We only have notified open positions at the job centers that do not constitute the whole universe of open positions.
Indeed, comparison of recent firm survey data with the data on registered vacancies suggest that about 1/3 of all
open positions are announced to job centers. We take it therefore only as an indicator.
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Table 1: GDP, unemployment rates, and transition rates over the business cycle
Statistic mean std corr Transition
rate
mean std corr
Germany
GDP
2.4 1
EU
0.5 15.1 -0.81
U.S. 2.6 1 2.0 6.5 -0.72
Germany
Productivity
1.6 0.77
UE
6.2 10.4 0.40
U.S. 1.4 0.44 30.7 11.2 0.82
Germany
Earnings
1.7 0.84
EE
0.9 15.6 0.65
U.S. 1.8 0.42 2.6 6.3 0.65
Germany
Vacancies
33.4 0.82
EN
1.0 6.2 0.53
U.S. 20.4 0.85 2.7 4.6 0.44
Germany
Urate
8.4 18.1 -0.76
UN
4.9 10.3 0.45
U.S. 6.3 15.0 -0.89 26.6 9.1 0.73
Notes: Standard deviations (STD) are given as percentage deviations from an HP-filtered trend (λ = 100000) of the
rates (in logs). Correlations (CORR) give the correlation coefficient with GDP. Our productivity measure is GDP
per employed. Source: Authors’ own calculations based on IAB data.
substantially lower and differs by a factor of 5.10 A reverse picture arises for the volatilities. While
the UE rates in both countries are still equally volatile, the German EU rate turns out to be 2.3
times more volatile than the U.S. rate.11 Figure 1(a) visualizes the close connection of the cyclical
component of the EU rate and the unemployment rate in Germany while the link is present but
not as close in the U.S. (Figure 1(b)).
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Figure 1: Cyclical component of EU rate and unemployment rate
Notes: The figure shows the cyclical component of the EU rate and the official unemployment rate based on an
HP-filter (λ = 100000). The red solid line is the EU rate and the blue dashed line is the unemployment rate.
The exit rate (EU + EN) tends towards acyclicality both in Germany (correlation −0.47) and the
10These lower rates can be observed throughout the sample period and are not an artifact of the developments
in the nineties. In 1980, the average UE rate in Germany is 10.9% declining over time to 4.7% in the mid-nineties
(1995). During the same time period the EU rate increased from 0.4% to 0.5%.
11Given that we study the interaction of long-run means and cyclical volatilities and the long lasting consequences
of business cycle shocks we prefer a high smoothing parameter to the HP Filter. We follow Shimer (2005) in this
choice who finds that a lower smoothing parameter like the traditionally chosen λ = 1, 600 for business cycle analysis
removes a lot of the cyclical variation of interest.
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U.S. (correlation −0.24). This is due to countercyclical EU rates and procyclical EN rates. Only
for Germany, we have EE flows for the whole sample period. If we add these to the total separation
rate (EU + EN + EE), the correlation turns positive (correlation 0.46) as a consequence of the
procyclical EE flows. These results suggest that EN flows are rather different to EU flows and
seem to have more in common with EE flows than with EU flows. Support for this view comes
from Nagypal (2005). She shows that for the U.S. many EN flows are reverted one month later
suggesting possibly the move to a new employer with an intervening month of inactivity.
2.3 Unemployment decomposition
To address the importance of in- and outflows in explaining unemployment volatility, we use the
methodology proposed in Fujita and Ramey (2009) but develop also an extended decomposition
with three states and six transition rates to control for flows into inactivity. Details on the volatility
decomposition of Fujita and Ramey (2009) and our extension can be found in Appendix A.1.12
Table 2 summarizes our finding based on the two state and three state decomposition where the
numbers present the share in unemployment volatility attributed to the respective rates.
Table 2: Unemployment Volatility Decomposition
Country Data EU UE NE EN NU UN ε
Germany
IAB 61.1 38.6 0.3
IAB 42.5 24.6 20.0 −4.5 6.6 11.0 −0.3
U.S.
Shimer 32.6 67.6 −0.2
Fujita/Ramey 38.4 61.9 −0.2
Shimer 20.1 48.6 8.8 −3.8 10.4 15.2 0.7
Notes: Data is HP-filtered (λ = 100, 000) for the period 1980q1 − 2004q4. For Germany the transition rates are for
all workers. The U.S. data is obtained from Shimer (2007) and Fujita and Ramey (2009). Contribution shares are
given as percentage numbers. Source: Authors’ own calculations based on IAB data.
Based on a two state decomposition the contribution of EU rates account for more than 60% of the
volatility in unemployment while in the U.S. it accounts for 30−40%. The three state decomposition
indicates that German EU rates contribute about twice as much to the unemployment volatility as
the UE rates, while in the U.S. the opposite is the case. EU and UE rates taken together account
in both countries for around 2/3 of the unemployment volatility possibly justifying the focus on a
12Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) analyze the contribution of job in- and outflow rates to the fluctuations in
unemployment for the UK, France, and Spain. Fujita and Ramey (2009) present an analysis for the U.S. Elsby, Hobijn,
and Sahin (2010) estimate in- and outflow rates from aggregate data for OECD countries to study the decomposition
of unemployment dynamics. In their analysis the estimated transition rates for most European countries yield an
insufficient approximation of the steady state unemployment rate. Once they account in their decomposition for
deviations from steady state their results are again consistent with our findings. The analysis in all papers is based
on a first-order approximation around trend unemployment but the detrending methods and the considered labor
market flows differ. The analysis in Petrongolo and Pissarides is based on a first difference filter allowing for four
aggregate transition rates whereas Fujita and Ramey use the HP-Filter and a two state decomposition. Fujita and
Ramey show that the first difference filter is typically very sensitive to high-frequency fluctuations. The online
appendix provides sensitivity with respect to these methods.
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two-state decomposition.
Our empirical findings show that the German labor market is characterized by substantially lower
average transitions rates compared to the U.S. Despite a similar UE rate volatility the German EU
rate volatility though is substantially larger. In reaction to shocks the German labor market relies
more heavily on adjusting the inflow rate while the U.S. labor market relies more on the outflow
rate.
3 Model
To understand the differential labor markets in the two countries we develop an extended version
of a Mortensen-Pissarides-style search and matching model. In the general version of the model we
allow for a generic idiosyncratic state process which we will later attach specific forms in order to
model tenure on the job, individual or match specific skills.
There is a continuum of workers with measure one. Workers and firms are risk neutral. Workers
can be either employed or unemployed denoted by e˜ ∈ {e, u}. The aggregate technology state A
is random and follows a Markov process. Additionally, there is an idiosyncratic state attached to
each worker denoted by x ∈ X. This state also follows a Markov process. We allow this process to
depend on the labor market transition from the current labor market state e˜ to next period’s state
e˜′, for example to model the loss of firm specific human capital after an EU transition (turbulence).
This means the model has different conditional distributions over tomorrow’s idiosyncratic state
depending on current and future employment status. We denote these distributions by pee(x
′|x),
peu(x
′|x), pue(x
′|x), and puu(x
′|x) depending on wether the agent stays employed, moves into
unemployment, out of unemployment or stays unemployed, respectively.
The measure of unemployed workers in the different idiosyncratic states is denoted by u(x) and for
employed workers by l(x). The joint distribution over employment states e˜ and idiosyncratic states
x is λ : {e, u} × X→ [0, 1] where Λ denotes the set of possible joint distributions.
Time is discrete. Workers who are currently in a match bargain jointly and efficiently over the
wage and the separation decision for the next period. If the bargaining is successful, they produce
output according to the production technology Ag(x) where the aggregate technology A evolves
exogenously and common to all matches, and g(x) summarizes the individual productivity for a
worker of type x. At the end of the period, the firm receives an idiosyncratic cost shock ε. We
assume that ε is i.i.d. across firms and over time and logistically distributed with mean zero and
variance pi
2
3 ψ
2
ε . The assumption of a logistic distribution allows us to obtain closed form solutions
and is done for convenience. The firm has to pay the costs  only if it wishes to continue the
production process. The costs are sunk after the period and will not affect any future decision. At
the bargaining stage the firm and the worker agree upon a threshold value ¯ for the continuation
costs ε.
If the realized continuation costs  are larger than the threshold value ¯, the match dissolves and
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the firm has to pay a state dependent firing tax τ(x) to the government and the worker becomes
unemployed. The transition probability for the individual state in this case is peu(x
′|x).13 If the
costs  are smaller than the cut-off value ¯, then they the firm pays the continuation costs and
continues the match. In this case, the worker transits to a new idiosyncratic state with probability
pee(x
′|x). This structure of the optimal decision allows us to cast the separation decision solely in
terms of cut-off values.14
An unemployed worker searches for a job and is matched in a matching market governed by a stan-
dard Cobb-Douglas matching function. Search is random so unemployed workers receive job offers
from firms with probability piue. Together with the offer comes a realized idiosyncratic productivity
component. The probability distribution for the idiosyncratic state is pue(x
′|x). In case the worker
does not receive an offer, a new idiosyncratic state is drawn according to puu(x
′|x). While unem-
ployed, a worker has a utility flow b˜(A, x) which might depend on the current idiosyncratic state but
also on the aggregate state. We include the dependence on the aggregate and idiosyncratic states to
capture in a simple way the effects of wage rigidity. Specifically, we use b˜(A, x) = exp(ϕ(x) log(A))b.
This functional form includes the different cases studied in the literature. Using ϕ = 1, we mimic
very flexible wages, using ϕ = 0, we have our benchmark case used in Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008), and using ϕ < 0, we can mimic a stronger form of wage rigidity inducing a
countercyclical element to the surplus that will amplify shocks.15
Consider a worker-firm pair at the beginning of the period. The firm discounts the future, as does
the worker, with a constant discount factor β. For given wages w : R × X × Λ → R+ and cut-off
13Note that τ (x) is expressed as a firing tax, or a reorganization cost and does not include severance payments.
In our framework, severance payments are efficiently bargained away and would have no effect on the equilibrium
outcomes. The government transfers all income lump sum back to the worker, so under risk-neutrality, there is no
need to formally specify governmental behavior.
14Technically, the cut-off value represents a quantile of the cost shock distribution and the cost shock ε itself will
not appear explicitly in any further expression.
15We allow for a possible type dependence on the idiosyncratic state to include the case were newly employed
workers have a different degree of wage rigidity as continuously employed workers, see section 5.3.
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strategies ¯ : R× X× Λ→ R+ the firm’s surplus and the probability pieu are given by
16
J(A, x, λ) = Ag(x) − w(A, x, λ)
+
∫ ¯
−∞
(
βE
[∑
x′
pee(x
′|x)J(A′, x′, λ′)
]
− ε
)
df(ε)−
∫ ∞
¯
τ(x)df(ε) (1)
pieu(A, x, λ) = 1− Prob(ε < ¯) =
(
1 + exp
(
¯(A, x, λ)
ψε
))−1
.
The value functions for employed workers Ve : R+ × X × Λ → R and unemployed workers Vu :
R+ × X× Λ→ R are given by
Ve(A, x, λ) = w(A, x, λ) + (1− pieu(A, x, λ))βE
[∑
x′
pee(x
′|x)Ve(A
′, x′, λ′)
]
+pieu(A, x, λ)βE
[∑
x′
peu(x
′|x)Vu(A
′, x′, λ′)
]
(2)
Vu(A, x, λ) = b exp(ϕ(x) log(A)) + (1− piue(A,λ))βE
[∑
x′′
puu(x
′′|x)Vu(A
′, x′′, λ′)
]
+piue(A,λ)βE
[∑
x′
pue(x
′|x)Ve(A
′, x′, λ′)
]
. (3)
We denote the worker’s surplus by ∆(A, x, λ) = Ve(A, x, λ)− Vu(A, x, λ) and the match surplus as
S(A, x, λ) = J(A, x, λ) + Ve(A, x, λ) − Vu(A, x, λ).
New matches are formed by a standard Cobb-Douglas matching technology that links searching
workers to vacancies. The measure of unemployed workers is denoted by u, the vacancies posted
are denoted by v, and the resulting matches by m.
m = κv1−%u%
u =
∑
x∈X
u(x).
16Solving the conditional expectation for pieu(A,x) the firm’s profit is
J(A, x, λ) = Ag(x)− w(A,x, λ) + (1− pieu(A,x, λ))βE
[∑
x′
pee(x
′|x)J(A′, x′, λ′)
]
− pieu(A,x, λ)τ (x) + Ψ(A, x, λ).
Evaluating the integrals under the distributional assumptions yields the given functional form. The option value Ψ
follow directly from the assumption of a logistically distributed cost shock and captures the value of having a choice
to continue the match and is always positive
Ψ(A,x) = −ψε
(
(1− pieu(A,x, λ)) log(1− pieu(A,x, λ)) + pieu(A, x, λ) log(pieu(A, x, λ))
)
.
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The matching efficiency κ measures how effectively unemployed workers are matched to open
positions. Examples for factors that can influence the matching efficiency are the willingness of
workers to move for a new job, skill mismatch, or bureaucracy in employment agencies. Labor
market tightness is defined as usual as the ratio of vacancies to searching workers θ := v
u
. The
probability that a searching worker will meet a firm is
piue(A,λ) =
m
u
= κθ1−%
and the probability that a firm posting a vacancy will meet some worker is given by
pive =
m
v
= κθ−%.
To determine the number of vacancies posted, we impose a standard free entry condition
κ = pive
∑
x∈X
u(x)
u
βE
[∑
x′
J(A′, x′, λ′)pue(x
′|x)
]
.
The probability of meeting a specific worker with characteristics x is u(x)
u
. We assume Nash bargain-
ing jointly over wages and cut-off values. The outcome of the bargaining process is characterized
by
{w, ω¯} = argmax
w,ω¯
µ log (∆(A, x, λ)) + (1− µ) log (J(A, x, λ))
where µ denotes the bargaining power of the worker. First-order conditions deliver
ω¯(A, x, λ) = βE
[∑
x′
pee(x
′|x)(J(A′, x′, λ′)
+Ve(A
′, x′, λ′))−
∑
x′
peu(x
′|x)Vu(A
′, x′, λ′)
]
+ τ(x)
µ
1− µ
=
∆(A, x, λ)
J(A, x, λ)
.
Technology evolves exogenously according to
A = exp(a) a′ = ρa+ η′
where ρ denotes the auto-correlation coefficient and innovations η are normally distributed. Addi-
tionally to aggregate productivity we have in general to keep track of employment states by skill
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status whose laws of motion are given by:
l′(x′) =
∑
x
(1− pieu(A, x, λ))pee(x
′|x)l(x) +
∑
x
piue(A,λ)pue(x
′|x)u(x)
u′(x′) =
∑
x
pieu(A, x, λ)peu(x
′|x)l(x) +
∑
x
(1− piue(A,λ))puu(x
′|x)u(x)
1 =
∑
x
u(x) +
∑
x
l(x).
4 Baseline Specification and Results
This section explains why the cross-country differences we document empirically can be explained
by differences in the matching efficiency. In our baseline specification presented in this section we
specialize to the homogeneous worker case abstracting from idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. we set x = 1,
so all policy rules are functions of the aggregate state only.17 We first characterize the working of
the model and explain why it accounts for the cross-country differences in the first and the second
moments jointly. To do so, we provide an analytic link between the structural parameters of the
model capturing institutional differences across countries and these moments. Finally, we offer a
quantitative exploration.
4.1 Basic Mechanism
Table 3 shows the steady state of the model and gives an analytical characterization of the volatilities
based on a first-order approximation, where σy captures the deviation of a variable y from its steady
state value y¯ when the productivity state is a, i.e. y− y¯ = σya and σ˜y =
σy
y¯
denotes the percentage
deviation. The absolute value of σ˜y coincides with the log standard deviations relative to the
standard deviation of productivity. We also report some simple approximations to the resulting
expressions to gain intuition.
As Table 3 shows the EU rate volatility (|σ˜eu|) is linear in the surplus reaction σS scaled by the
standard deviation ψ of the continuation-cost. Intuitively, less dispersed cost shocks lead to a larger
fraction of firms living around the cut-off value ¯. As a consequence, a change in the surplus after
a business cycle shock will lead to more firms that draw cost shocks below the cut-off value and
decide to dissolve. At the aggregate level this implies an increase in the EU rate after a negative
business cycle shock making EU rates countercyclical.18
Unlike the EU rate volatility the UE rate volatility (|σ˜ue|) is linear in the relative surplus volatility
σS
S
. This makes the UE rate volatility a direct function of the outside option b (see approximation), a
17In the absence of idiosyncratic shocks the model is block-recursive in the sense of Menzio and Shi (2009) so the
employment measure does not enter the policy functions.
18This is the standard logic of generating countercyclical EU rates and applies as well to models using log-normal
multiplicative shocks.
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Table 3: Analytic Expressions for the First and Second Moments
Exact Approximation
S¯ A¯−b−ψ log(1−p¯ieu)1−β(1−p¯iueµ)
A¯−b
p¯iueµ
p¯iue κ
(
(1−µ)κβS¯
κ
) 1−%
%
κ
(
1−µ
µ
A¯−b
κ
)1−%
p¯ieu
(
1 + exp
(
βS¯+τ
ψ
))−1 (
1 + exp
(
A¯−b
p¯iueµψ
+ τ
ψ
))−1
σS
(
1− βρ
(
1− p¯ieu + p¯iue
µ
%
))−1
%
A¯−b
S¯
σ˜ue (1− %)
ρ
%
σS
S¯
1−%
A¯−b
σ˜eu −(1− p¯ieu)
ρβ
ψ
σS −
%
A¯−b
S¯
ψ
Notes: Analytic exact expressions for steady states are in the first column. Approximations using βρ ≈ 1 and piEU ≈ 0
are given in the second column.
fact that has been discussed in the recent literature Shimer (2005); Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
As a consequence, our calibration will require an outside option b that is close to productivity to
match the UE rate volatility, but this is not decisive for our argument as we show in section 5. The
presence of endogenous destruction has no first order effect on the UE rate volatility. Separations
are efficiently bargained and reflect a choice of the match, so their impact is of second order on
the dynamics of the relative change in the surplus. However, endogenous destruction affects the
model’s unemployment rate volatility.
|σ˜u| =
|σeu(1− u¯)− σueu¯|
u¯
√
1− (1− p¯iue − p¯ieu)2
√
1 + ρ(1 − p¯iue − p¯ieu)
1− ρ(1 − p¯iue − p¯ieu)
≈ (|σ˜eu|+ |σ˜ue|)(1− u¯)
The contribution of the EU rate to the unemployment volatility is essentially driven by the ratio
|σ˜eu| to |σ˜ue|.
19 Using the approximation from table 3, we see that the contribution of the EU rate
to the unemployment volatility is proportional to the average surplus
|σ˜eu|
|σ˜ue|
=
%
1− %
S¯
ψ
and to explain a higher contribution of EU transitions to the volatility of the unemployment in
19The formula shows that a cross-country comparison should be based on the volatility of the percentage deviation
not the rates in levels. Two countries with similar unemployment rates but different UE and EU rates would have
an identical reaction to shocks if the log volatilities are identical, while they would differ substantially if the rate
volatilities would be identical.
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Germany we directly see that the average surplus has to be larger.
The EU rate volatility |σ˜eu| is an increasing function of the average match surplus and is inversely
related to the average UE rate (cp. approximation in table 3). The intuition for the inverse
relationship has its seeds in the reemployment prospects of workers after separation. This can be
seen by looking at the recursive formula of the surplus obtained from equations (1), (2) and (3),
where we set ψlog(1− pieu) ≈ 0 for simplicity
S ≈ A− b+ βE
[
S′
]
− piUEµE
[
S′
]
.
We see that the current surplus is the discounted surplus of the current match A− b+ βE [S′] net
of the outside opportunity piUEµE [S
′] in an alternative match of the worker.20
Consider now how a positive business cycle shock affects these two values. The surplus of the
current match increases making it less likely that an idiosyncratic shocks hitting the match will
lead to a separation. As a result, the EU rate falls making it countercyclical. At the same time, the
increase in the surplus of the current match is dampened by the reaction of the outside opportunity
of the worker which enters negatively into the total surplus and will therefore lower the reaction
σS . In a boom the outside opportunity will increase because the prospects of finding a job quickly
increase and the expected surplus of an alternative match also rises.
The cross-country differences in the outside opportunity explains the differences in the reaction to
shocks. Take Germany that has a lower average UE rate. At the onset of a boom, the opportunity
costs of separating for the German worker are higher because she misses particularly productive
times. On average the German worker searches for a new job for roughly a year and the worker has
missed the most profitable times of being employed. This makes her more reluctant to separate
in reaction to the shock. The U.S. worker instead needs to search on average only three months
and is still able to benefit from the booming conditions by quickly accepting a new job offer. As
a consequence the increase in the outside opportunity in the U.S. is stronger at the beginning of a
boom compared to Germany. This dampens the reaction of the surplus and ultimately lowers the
EU rate volatility.21
20We use the term outside opportunity because it captures the expected value of an alternative match in case of
separation.
21A corresponding argument shows that at the beginning of a recession the German worker will be more willing to
separate from the current job compared to the U.S. worker in reaction to the shock. Now, the current match surplus
falls. The expected outside opportunity of the worker falls, too, dampening the decline in the total surplus. However,
the dampening effect will be smaller in Germany given that the outside opportunity receives less weight due to the
lower UE rate. As a result, the surplus reaction in Germany will be stronger and the German worker will effectively
spend a longer time being unemployed, i.e. the relative value of unemployment has increased by more than in the
U.S.. As discussed above, the decrease in the surplus makes it more likely that an idiosyncratic shock destroys the
match, and therefore, EU rates react more strongly in Germany.
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4.2 Institutional Factors
What institutional factors can explain the observed differences in labor market outcomes between
the U.S. and Germany? Our intuition developed so far has focused on the transmission from mean
transition rates to volatilities, which are both endogenous objects. We now provide the link to the
underlying structural parameters. Table 4 reports the analytic elasticities of the average rates and
the volatilities with respect to a change in the underlying parameter. They can be used to sign the
impact of each of the structural parameters on the four endogenous dimensions considered in this
paper.22
Table 4: Analytic approximations of steady state elasticities
p Parameter p
piue
dpiue
dp
p
pieu
dpieu
dp
p
|σ˜eu|
d|σ˜eu|
dp
p
σ˜ue
dσ˜ue
dp
κ Matching Effi-
ciency
%
1−%
%
1−%
S¯
ψ
− %1−% 0
µ Bargaining
Power
− 1−%1−µ −
µ−%
1−µ
S¯
ψ
µ−%
1−µ 0
b Outside Option − (1−%)b
A¯−b
%b
µψp¯iue
(1− %) b
A¯−b
b
A¯−b
τ Firing Tax − (1−%)τp¯ieu
A¯−b
−(1− %p¯ieu
µp¯iue
) τ
ψ
(1− %) τp¯ieu
A¯−b
τ p¯ieu
A¯−b
ψ Shock Variance − Ψ¯(1−%)
A¯−b
τ+S¯
ψ
+ Ψ¯%
ψµp¯iue
−
(
1− Ψ¯(1−%)
A¯−b
)
Ψ¯
A¯−b
Notes: Approximation to the steady state elasticities. Ψ¯ is the steady state value of the option value from the
separation decision. The approximation is based on βρ ' 1.
The upper part of table 3 shows that there are essentially three options to generate lower average
UE rates in Germany: First, a lower efficiency of the matching function κ in Germany and an
associated increase in the effective cost per unit of vacancies posted. The parameter captures in
a reduced form sense frictions in the entry process like for example skill, occupational, or regional
mismatch. A decline lowers the average UE rate, increases the surplus of the match, and lowers the
average EU rate. The UE rate volatility remains unchanged because the increase in the surplus is
accompanied by an increase in the effective cost to post a vacancy, keeping the percentage change
in the surplus largely unaffected. The EU rate volatility increases by the same factor as the average
UE rate declines (cp. table 4, first row) matching therefore all of our stylized facts qualitatively.
Second, higher benefits b as argued for in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) lowers the surplus of the
match, lowers profits, and the average UE rate. The lower surplus would lead to a counterfactual
22To obtain the elasticities we make use of the fact that both the average rates and the volatilities are simple
functions of the average match surplus (see table 3). Implicitly differentiating the steady state surplus equation
yields the results. To ease readability we use again some simple approximations. The online appendix reports the
exact elasticities without the approximation and explains the derivation in detail. The approximation captures the
effects quantitatively reasonably well as we show in the next section.
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increase in the average EU rate, so this option has to rely on additional firing taxes τ to jointly
explain the mean rate differences across countries. Still, the mechanism will be inconsistent with
the second moments of the data. The third row in table 4 shows that the reaction of the EU rate
volatility (|σ˜eu|) is always lower by a factor 1−% compared to the reaction of the UE rate volatility
(|σ˜ue|). Therefore a decline in the surplus will unambiguously decrease the contribution of inflows
relative to outflows in the unemployment volatility and will be inconsistent with the empirical
evidence. A similar argument can be made for higher firing taxes (cp. table 4, fourth row).
Third, a higher bargaining power of the worker µ in Germany lowers the share of the surplus
accruing to the firm. This lowers the incentives to create jobs, and thereby lowers the average UE
rate. This mechanism is used for example in Blanchard and Portugal (2001) who argue that the
employment protection legislation implicitly increases the threat point of the worker, and therefore
effectively raises the bargaining power. The effect of a higher bargaining power on the average
surplus is ambiguous and depends on the distance to the Hosios point of efficiency (cp. table 4,
second row). Two counteracting forces are at work: a higher bargaining power lowers the UE rate
which tends to increase the average surplus as explained above. But at the same time the outside
opportunity of the worker raises relative to the current match which tends to lower the average
surplus. Exactly at the Hosios condition the surplus is minimized23 and the bargaining power of
the worker µ is equal to the matching elasticity %. To see this, we implicitly differentiate the steady
state surplus with respect to the bargaining power
∂S
∂µ
=
µ− %
1− µ
βS¯p¯iue
%
(
1− β + β
(
p¯ieu +
µ
%
p¯ieu
))
It can be immediately verified that the surplus has its minimum at the Hosios condition.24 In-
tuitively, the benchmark scenario of a perfectly competitive market without search and matching
friction would compete the surplus to zero, making all workers employed, and force wages to be
equal to productivity. The matching frictions impose a deviation from this benchmark leading to
a positive surplus. The social planner minimizes this deviation by putting the economy at the
Hosios condition given all other parameters. As a result, the EU rate volatility is also minimized.
Due to the sign switch in the elasticity of |σ˜eu| at the Hosios condition (cp. table 4, second row)
a cross-country change in the bargaining power can therefore increase or decrease the EU rate
volatility depending on the initial conditions. To the extend that the change in the bargaining
power is large enough the channel works similarly to a change in the match efficiency. It lowers the
gains from posting a vacancy and simultaneously increase the surplus of the match. However, the
outside opportunity of the worker is directly affected which tends to dampen the EU rate volatility
23Despite our endogenous destruction mechanism, it is straightforward to show that the Hosios condition still holds
in our framework, conditional on interpreting the outside option as home-production or the value of leisure, not as a
choice of the government.
24The second term is always positive, so that the extremum must be a minimum.
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quantitatively.
Table 4 shows that larger firing taxes τ or differences in the continuation-cost variance ψ also affect
the average UE rate but this is only through their effect on the average EU rate, so their impact
turns out to be quantitatively small.
4.3 Quantitative Results
A lower matching efficiency moves the economy qualitatively in the right direction. We now show
that it can explain the cross-country differences quantitatively.
In the calibration we harmonize 4 parameters to be equal across country and allow 5 parameters
to vary. Data moments and estimated parameters are given in Table 5. We set the autocorrelation
of the aggregate shock to ρ = 0.975 implying a standard estimate of 0.95 on a quarterly base, and
normalize the productivity volatility to 1.4% for both countries in line with our empirical findings
for the U.S. We set the discount factor β = 0.996 implying an annual interest rate of 4% and the
matching elasticity % = 0.5 in line with estimates reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
We normalize vacancy posting cost κ = 0.38 to obtain a probability of filling a vacancy of 90% per
month for the U.S.25 We assume these four parameters to be equal across countries. The remaining
parameters b, ψ, τ,κ are chosen to exactly match the average rates and the volatilities. Additionally
we follow Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and choose the bargaining power µ to match the wage
elasticity |σw|. We target σw = 0.8 in both countries in line with our empirical estimates reported
below.26 We see in Table 5 that the benefit level b, the firing tax τ and the idiosyncratic shock
variance ψ appear to be similar across country. The main difference that arises is a substantially
lower matching efficiency that declined by 65% and an increase in the bargaining power.
Next we investigate more carefully which of these differences are most important, i.e. explain
25The value is in between the estimates used in Shimer (2005) (κ = 0.21) and Hall (2008) κ = 0.43. The model
depends essentially on the ratio κ
κ
so our findings would also hold for an increase in vacancy posting cost. However,
an increase in vacancy posting cost turns out to increase the probability of finding a worker, while evidence on
open positions suggest that firms search considerably longer in Germany, in line with a decline in the average match
efficiency. For the benchmark calibration we find pive = 0.64. Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2009) documents
that the average job filling rate for the U.S. ranges from 16 to 25 working days during the period 2001 - 2006. Adding
in weekends and holidays this period increases to 19 to 29 days. For West Germany the search duration, i.e. from
the begin of search to signing the work contract, averages to 48 days for the period 1989 - 2001 with a low at 38 days
in 1997 and a high in 1991 and 1992 of 57 days. The average time for which open positions are registered at the
Employment Agencies shows similar pattern over time and the same level of 48 days for the corresponding period.
The time of registration for open positions is available back until 1980 and averages to 43 days if the whole period is
considered. If we consider the period from the begin of search to starting work instead of signing the contract, then
the search time for the period 1989 - 2001 increases significantly to 76 days. The data on duration of open positions
has been kindly provided by the IAB.
26The first-order approximation for the wage elasticity is
σw = µσS
(
1− βρ(1− p¯ieu − p¯iue) + βρp¯iue
1− %
%
− p¯ieu(1− p¯ieu)β
S¯
ψ
)
For Germany and the U.S. σw = 0.8 is at the upper range of the estimates as we will discuss below and delivers fairly
flexible wages, see Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) for a U.S. estimate.
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Table 5: Calibration
Parameter κ µ ψ b/w τ
U.S. 0.52 0.27 0.98 0.95 3.23
Germany 0.18 0.52 0.9 0.95 3.38
Data target p¯iue p¯ieu |σ˜eu| σ˜ue σ˜w
U.S. 30.6 2.0 6.5 11.2 0.8
Germany 6.8 0.53 15.1 10.4 0.8
Notes: Data targets and calibrated parameters.
the bulk of the different labor market targets. We start from the calibrated U.S. economy and
change one parameter at a time to match one target for the German economy (bold number).
Table 6 reports in the first column the parameter that has been changed relative to the calibrated
U.S. economy and the corresponding value. The cases µ = 0.5 (Hosios condition) and µ = 0.73
(volatilities identical to the U.S. benchmark) are included to highlight the changing effect of the
bargaining power on σ˜eu. Some points are worth noticing: (1) A decline in the efficiency of the
Table 6: Parameter experiments
p¯iue p¯ieu |σ˜eu| |σ˜ue| |σ˜w |
|σ˜eu|
|σ˜eu|+|σ˜ue|
Germany (data) 6.8 0.53 15.1 10.4 0.8 61.1
(1) κ = 0.14 6.8 0.67 19.4 11.5 0.6 62.8
(2) µ = 0.5 19.3 2.12 5.9 11.3 0.87 34.3
(3) µ = 0.73 11.4 2.0 6.5 11.2 0.87 36.7
(4) µ = 0.88 6.8 1.75 8.4 11.3 0.87 42.6
(5) b/w = 0.99 6.8 3.15 14.3 112 0.5 11.3
(6) τ = 4.6 26 0.53 8.1 16.8 0.85 32.5
(7) ψ = 0.7 25 0.53 11.6 17.1 0.85 40.4
Notes: The first column gives the parameter and the corresponding value that has been changed relative to the
calibrated U.S. economy. The bold number shows the targeted data point. The two cases where no data point is
targeted examine the non-monotonic effect of µ on σ˜ue.
matching process (κ) can qualitatively and largely quantitatively account for the bulk of the cross
country differences in the means and the volatilities. The EU rate volatility is a bit too high
while the wage elasticity is too low. An increase in the bargaining power dampens both effects
and allows us to align model and data (see Tables 4 and 5). As discussed above starting below
the Hosios condition for the U.S. we observe a decline in the EU rate volatility for values below
µ = 0.73 27, so our final parameter choice µGER = 0.52 dampens the EU rate volatility. (2) An
increase in the bargaining power alone, beyond the point of µ = 0.73, starts to increase the average
surplus in Germany and would qualitatively move the economy in the right direction, but leaves us
27We consider µ = 0.73 in particular because there it holds that µ = %+ 0.23 and we had µUS = %− 0.23.
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quantitatively substantially away from the observed differences. Both the changes in the average
EU rate as well as in the EU rate volatility are too small. (3) As expected an increase in benefits
(b) will increase the UE rate volatility substantially whereas the EU rate volatility increases only
slightly. As we will show below this effect is not an artifact of the small surplus calibration but will
also hold more broadly in a ‘large surplus’ calibration with rigid wages. (4) An increase in firing
taxes mechanically lowers the average EU rate, but has only a very modest impact on the average
UE rate and almost no impact on the EU volatility while increasing the UE volatility. (5) Finally,
the variance of the idiosyncratic shock process ψ lowers the average EU rate, but increases both
the EU and UE volatility, leaving the contribution of the ins and the outs in the decomposition of
the unemployment volatility unaffected.
To align model and data our findings suggest that a large fraction of the cross-country differences
are due to a substantially lower matching efficiency in Germany.
4.4 Transmission of Shocks
In this section we ask whether the highlighted differences matter for the transmission of shocks.
We first present some evidence that the simple shock structure still captures important aspects of
the data. We then report impulse response function to highlight differences in the transmission of
shocks.
We evaluate the performance of the model by studying its predictive power. We estimate for
both countries the underlying shock processes using a Kalman filter on GDP growth. We feed
the estimated processes into the model using the estimated parameters of Table 5 and predict all
endogenous variables applying an HP-filter (λ = 100, 000) to the resulting time-series. Figure 2
graphically illustrates the successes and failures of the simple model. The time series patterns of
the unemployment rate are predicted well and the model captures the EU rate and the UE rate
dynamics in both countries. The model reproduces the time series pattern of earnings in Germany
very well, while it fails to predict the earnings in the nineties for the U.S.. Still, the success for
both countries lends some credit to the underlying mechanism explored in this paper.
Figure 3 shows impulse-response functions for the calibrated economies after a large negative shock
of 4% that roughly matches the increase in the unemployment rate at the beginning of the big
recession in Germany in the 80s after the second oil crisis. The impulse-responses uncover the
key cross-country difference in the reaction to a shock. In the U.S. the unemployment rate peaks
three quarters after the initial shock, while in Germany it peaks after nine quarters uncovering a
substantial propagation to shocks in Germany. Hence, the German recovery is very sluggish. In
fact, five years after the shock has hit the economy the German unemployment rate is still 23%
away from its long-run average while the U.S. is only 12% above its steady state value. Although
peak unemployment is similar across the two countries, the unconditional standard deviation of the
unemployment rate in the model for Germany is still 29% larger than for the U.S., consistent with
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Figure 2: Data and predicted series
Notes: The figure plots the model predictions (red dotted lines) and the data (blue solid line). The prediction is
based on a technology process obtained from a Kalman filter on GDP growth. Model and data are in logs and are
HP-filtered with λ = 100, 000. Earnings for Germany refer to median earnings obtained from the microdata.
our empirical findings.
The difference in the reaction of the unemployment rate to shocks are not generated by differences
in the reaction of wages. Despite the lower bargaining power in the U.S. the wage reaction was
targeted to be the same across the two countries, and is confirmed in figure 3(e). The difference
is also not due to differences in the UE reaction given that the reaction is almost identical in
both countries (figure 3(d)). What causes the sluggish response in Germany is an interplay of
the strong reaction in the EU rate causing a strong rise in unemployment (figure 3(c)) and the
low reemployment probabilities due to the lower average UE rate caused by the lower matching
efficiency in Germany. The low reemployment probability in Germany leads to a situation where
we observe output growth after 6 quarters in combination with increasing unemployment rates for
additional 3-4 quarters. For large shocks such a recovery might therefore well look like a period of
a jobless recovery Shimer (2010).
5 Additional Explanations and Robustness
The analysis of the benchmark model has shown that a simple version of firing tax is likely not
the main driving force for the observed cross-country differences. A large literature though has
argued that the employment protection legislation in general might be an important source for the
cross-country differences at least in the average transition rates. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008)
argue that a combination of higher benefits, larger firing taxes and micro-economic turbulence,
that is skill losses after a separation, can explain the U.S.-Europe differences in the mean rates.
Moreover the employment protection legislation might shield high tenured and low tenured workers
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions
Notes: The figure plots the impulse response functions for the U.S. (red dotted lines) and Germany (blue solid line)
on a quarterly scale.
differentially. This effect might give firms incentives to circumvent firing taxes for low tenured
workers using for example short-term employment contracts Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas (2010);
Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado, and Barbanchon (2010).
In this section we examine whether similar mechanisms could also explain the stylized facts for
the cross-country differences between Germany and the U.S. For this purpose we first present
empirical results for the labor market dynamics in Germany controlling for tenure. We then offer
a theoretical exploration based on the augmented model with idiosyncratic shocks that uses our
empirical findings to discriminate between these alternative explanations.
5.1 Tenure - Data
To examine the role of skill accumulation and employment protection empirically we construct
transition rates conditioning on tenure for four tenure classes. For Germany this data can be
constructed from the employment histories. For the U.S. we rely on irregular supplements to the
CPS that report information on tenure with the current employer.28 For both countries we report
in Table 7 time averages of monthly rates across all available observations.
We find that both countries show a strongly declining pattern of transition rates with tenure. This
holds for all separation rates either to a new firm, to unemployment or to inactivity. In Germany
28We use the Occupational Mobility and Job Tenure supplements for the years 1983, 1987, 1991, 1996, 1998, 2000,
2002, 2004, and 2006 where information on tenure is available. We link the supplement information to the basic
monthly data files as described in Shimer (2007). Using the linked monthly files, we construct gross flow rates by
tenure for the nine year/month pairs where tenure information is available. For the EE flows we can only use data
after 1994 because EE flows can not be identified before (For details see Fallick and Fleischman (2004)). For details,
see the technical appendix.
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the average rates are substantially below the U.S. rates in all tenure classes. However, the decline
across tenure groups is very similar in the two countries. In both countries the share of low tenured
worker29 in all EU transitions is larger than 50% but is a bit smaller in the U.S. (60%) compared to
Germany (72%). For Germany we can also look at the volatilities of transition rates across tenure
Table 7: Transition rates by tenure classes
tenure in
years
< 1 1− 2 2− 5 > 5
EU
Germany 1.8 0.7 0.4 0.2
U.S. 4.7 2.4 1.6 0.8
EE
Germany 1.8 1.1 0.8 0.4
U.S. 4.7 2.9 2.5 1.6
EN
Germany 1.9 0.6 0.4 0.2
U.S. 5.0 2.8 2.2 1.7
Notes: Tenure categories are given in years. All transition rates are given as percentages of the workers in the
respective tenure group and are averages over time. For Germany only workers in full-time employment over the
period 1980 − 2004 are considered. The U.S. rates are derived using the January and February supplements to the
Current Population survey (CPS) using available supplements in the period 1983 − 2006. Due to the rotation of
the panel and the point in time information on tenure in the CPS, we report only transition rates in the month
were tenure is available. U.S. transition rates are adjusted for seasonal effects and time aggregation to match their
unconditional averages. The transition rates for Germany are constructed from employment histories and seasonally
adjusted.
classes.30 Interestingly, we find that the EU rate volatility is very large for all tenure classes and
is, if anything, increasing over tenure.31 We conclude from these observations that our findings of
substantially larger EU rate volatilities is not driven by low tenured workers moving in and out of
employment alone but that this facts holds more broadly over tenure classes.
5.2 Augmented Model
To investigate whether differences in the human capital accumulation process or differential firing
taxes are major drivers of the labor market differences pointed out in section 2 we augment our
benchmark model to allow for worker and match-specific human capital accumulation. To econ-
omize on the state space, we assume that employed workers can be in three tenure states, low,
medium and high (L,M,H). We assume that workers stochastically gain match-specific skills by
staying at their firm, i.e. accumulating tenure. We normalize the initial state and set match specific
productivity in the lowest tenure state to sL = 1. The worker needs on average 2 years to transit
29We define low tenured as tenure below 2 years.
30Since we only have information at a limited set of points in time for the U.S., we can not calculate reasonable
volatilities for the different tenure classes there.
31The exact numbers for the standard deviations are 19.6, 17.4, 23.0, 23.4 where the first number refers to the
lowest tenure class and all numbers are given as percentages. The correlation is strongly negative also across tenure
classes. More details are provided in the online appendix.
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to tenure level M , and another three years to transit to the final tenure state H. Workers with
2− 5 years of tenure (state M) have a skill level sM = (1 + gM ) and workers with 5 years or more
of tenure (state L) have skill level sH = (1 + gH). Upon separation the worker loses tenure. We
target gM and gH to reproduce the declining EU transition rates in the United States. We find
gM = 0.034 and gH = 0.067 so the yearly increase of skills in tenure is roughly 1.3%.
32.
To study skill losses we additionally assume that the worker can be in one of three worker specific
skill states, namely bad, normal, or good with productivity denoted by zB ,zN , and zG respectively,
so that the total number of idiosyncratic productivity states is nine. We assume that the skill
process attached to the worker zi is given by a discrete approximation to an AR(1) process with three
states.33 We set the autocorrelation coefficient at 0.98 on a monthly basis to generate a persistent
process as in Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas (2010) and set the standard deviation to imply a shock
size of 10% in our discrete approximation, normalizing zN = 1.
34 Upon unemployment the workers
also switch states according to this AR(1) process, so we have to keep track of the distribution of
employed worker by skill and tenure level and unemployed worker by skill level.
Worker and match-specific transitions follow independent stochastic processes, so we calculate
the appropriate transitions functions pee, peu,pue and puu on the stacked vector of idiosyncratic
states as the convolution of the two processes and assume that a particular individual state is the
multiplication of the two processes.35 We aggregate over the worker specific states and report the
average for each tenure class.
We re-calibrate the remaining parameters to match the same aggregate statistics as in the bench-
mark case.36 The upper part of Table 8 reports the calibrated U.S. economy together with the
empirical targets. The last line in the upper part reports the data targets for Germany. In the
lower part of the table we perform foure experiments similar to the ones in table 6. Again, we
change parameters (first column) starting from the calibrated U.S. economy to match a German
data target (bold number).37
32Altonji and Williams (2005) reports gain to tenure of 11% for ten years for the U.S., roughly in line with these
numbers. Dustmann and Meghir (2005) report returns to tenure for skilled German worker between 1.7− 2.4%.
33We use the method of Kopecky and Suen (2010) to obtain the conditional Markov transition kernel numerically.
34In contrast to standard models with endogenous destruction the variance of the worker specific shock process is
less important for the business cycle dynamics given that separation rates are still governed by idiosyncratic match
specific shocks with variance proportional to ψ which we again calibrate to reproduce the aggregate EU rate volatility
of the U.S.. We varied the standard deviation between 5− 20% and re-calibrated ψ without affecting the results.
35That is the first state is x1 = sLzB , x2 = sLzN , . . . , x9 = sHzG. The resulting transition matrix pue(x, x′) for
example takes care of the fact that unemployed workers can only switch to low tenured jobs.
36We additionally introduce a stochastic probability of retiring to generate the tenure distribution. We set the
work-life to 40 years as in as in Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas (2010) and assume that newly born workers are born
with skill levels according to the invariant distribution of the Markov transition. We adjust the model equation
accordingly. We see that heterogeneity lowers the average net replacement rate, but only very modestly. All other
parameters are very similar to the benchmark case. This results for the U.S. economy in the following parameters
κ = 0.26, κ = 0.52, µ = 0.35, ψ = 1.08, b
w
= 0.926, and τ = 3.05.
37We rely numerically throughout on a first order approximation, given that the state space has to include all
employment states by skill, implying 18 state variables in the model.
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Table 8: Experiments
piEU,L pieu,M pieu,H piue σ˜ue σ˜eu,L σ˜eu,M σ˜eu,H σw
U.S. (Data) 3.55 1.68 0.8 30.6 11.2 *6.5* 0.8
U.S. (Model) 3.55 1.68 0.8 30.6 11.2 4.6 5.8 6.7 0.8
GER (Data) 1.3 0.4 0.2 6.2 10.5 18.4 23.5 23.4 0.8
(1) κ = 0.12 1.4 0.5 0.2 6.2 10.1 14.6 16.8 19.1 0.67
(2) τM , τH = 4.9 3.7 0.4 0.2 28.9 14.3 5.2 9.0 10.0 0.82
(3)
τM , τH = 4.5
2.9 0.4 0.2 6.2 12 8.0 12.6 14.5 0.94
µ = 0.92
(4) Turbulence 2.6 0.9 0.4 21.5 19 6.4 9.1 12.3 0.85
Notes: The upper part reports the data. The lower part reports the experiments. pieu,L, pieu,M and pieu,H denotes
the EU rate for low (medium, high) tenured worker averaged over all idiosyncratic skill levels. The same applies for
σ˜eu. The value on the EU rate volatility for the U.S. marked by * is the average over all tenure classes due to data
limitations.
5.2.1 Matching Efficiency Revisited
The first experiment decreases the matching efficiency (κ) to show that the identified mechanism
from the previous section still works in the extended model. The average UE rate falls. The surplus
in each tenure class increases in Germany due to the lower average UE rates, so accumulated skills
get more valuable. Upon separation high tenured workers will lose their tenure. Due to the
long search duration it takes longer to accumulate human capital in a new match which makes
German workers more reluctant to separate. The average EU rates fall in a way consistent with
the observed tenure patter. Moreover, due to the larger surplus in each tenure class the EU rate
volatilities increase.
5.2.2 Differential Firing Taxes
If differential firing taxes were an important driving force of the cross-country difference, one might
suspect that short-term employment contracts would be one possibility to circumvent this friction.38
To shed light on this alternative explanation we use in the second and third experiment differential
firing taxes to explain the decline in Germany for higher tenured worker. We keep τL at its U.S.
value and increase τM and τH to target the observed EU rates in Germany. We see in experiment
2 that the presence of tenure dependent firing taxes lead to a decline in the EU rates for protected
workers and to an increase for unprotected workers. The EU rate volatility modestly increases
for higher tenured workers due to a larger surplus, and remains largely unchanged for low tenured
worker. The unemployment volatility is amplified because both the UE rate as well as the EU rate
38There is no direct evidence that short-term employment contracts increased substantially in Germany during the
sample period, in contrast to southern European countries like Spain, which have witnessed large increases along this
margin.
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volatility increase. The contribution of the EU rate volatility though falls because the increase in
the UE rate volatility dominates, in line with our findings for the benchmark model.
A firing tax by itself has only a very small impact on the average UE rate. If firing taxes affect
in addition the threat point of the bargaining, the implicit bargaining power increases. The third
experiment varies therefore jointly the firing taxes as well as workers bargaining power. As analyzed
before, a substantial increase in the bargaining power will raise the surplus, if the deviation from
the Hosios condition is large enough (we need a µ = 0.92). Again, we would see a larger decline in
the EU rates for high tenured workers by construction, a counterfactually high average EU rate for
low tenured workers and a counterfactually low EU rate volatility. Moreover, the surplus of new
hires tends to decline, increasing the UE rate volatility.
5.2.3 Human Capital Accumulation and Turbulence
The final experiment considers a version of turbulence along the lines of Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2008) to study the role of worker and firm specific human capital. We assume that skills are more
firm specific in Germany and might be lost after a separation. Concretely, we assume that workers
with a good skill level lose their skills and become a normal type upon separation, while workers
with normal skill level become bad types. That is a large fraction of the work force lose 10% of
their skill level upon separation. This assumption transforms skills that are attached to the worker
in the U.S. to skills that are more specific to the match in Germany. 39
As a consequence of the higher risk of losing skills the surplus for medium and high skilled workers
increases due to the deterioration of the outside opportunity. As a result the average EU rates
decline for these groups. For low tenured workers the decline is not as pronounced as observed
in the data. Two effects are at work: The increase in the average surplus tends to increase the
average UE rate making it more attractive for firms to post vacancies because there is more to
split. However, the composition of the unemployment pool changes. There are more bad types in
the search pool, making it less attractive to post vacancies. In our calibration there are 44% bad
types in the unemployment pool for the U.S. while in Germany, due to the skill losses, the number
increases to 75%. If differences in the skill processes were the main driving force in explaining the
empirical labor market differences, the deterioration of skill effect has necessarily to dominate to
explain the low average UE rates observed in Germany as it does on our calibration. However,
the resulting decline in the expected surplus from creating an open position implies that the UE
rate volatility will increase and we find a counterfactual decline in the contribution of the EU flows
relative to the UE flows in the unemployment volatility.
Our experiments show that the behavior of the transitions rates by tenure are potentially infor-
39We choose this calibration that is at the upper end of empirically plausible values (Fujita (2008), Burda and
Mertens (2001)) to get the largest effects from our experiment. The flexible specification of the transition matrices
would also allow for specifications where only a share of workers looses its skills, however, effects then would be even
smaller.
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mative to discriminate between different explanations studied in the literature. Differential firing
taxes do not explain the low average transition rates of low tenured workers in Germany which
should be less affected by firing restrictions. Differences in the idiosyncratic skill processes either
increase the surplus, if they lead to more match specific skills in Germany, or decrease the expected
surplus, if the cost to re-training low tenured workers is large or the search pool has very bad skills.
In the former case the average UE rate should increase, because firms can exploit the worker better,
in the latter case the contribution of the UE rate volatility would increase. Both implications are
counter-factual. To explain the data one needs a mechanism that jointly increases the surplus and
lowers the average UE rate.
Our quantitative results so far have relied on the small surplus calibration of Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008). We now show that our results still hold under an alternative set of assump-
tions that allow for a larger surplus calibration and study the impact of wage rigidities on the
volatilities.
5.3 Rigid Earnings
The recent literature has stressed versions of wage rigidities as a potentially important source of
an amplification mechanism that can explain the large hiring rate volatilities without relying on
an outside option close to productivity (Shimer (2005), Hall (2005) and more recently Elsby and
Michaels (2010)). Maybe surprisingly, we find empirically that German earnings40 are not any
more rigid in Germany compared to the U.S., though confidence bands are large. We show on
theoretical grounds that strong versions of wage rigidity will affect the EU rate and the UE rate
volatility symmetrically, leaving the contribution rate to the unemployment volatility unaffected.
5.3.1 Empirical Estimates
As an empirical measure of earning rigidity the literature typically uses an elasticity estimate on
the reaction of wages or earnings with respect to a measure of the business cycle. As this measure
of business cycle either productivity or the unemployment rate have been used.
These studies also differ in the way how they control for selection effects. Several approaches have
been proposed to control for this composition bias. Following Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994)
we use a fixed group of individuals of continuously employed workers who stayed at the same firm
over the whole sample period. This selection rules out work force composition effects because the
composition of the group is fixed in terms of all observable characteristics.41 The drawback of this
40We focus on earnings because our dataset does not have an hours worked measure. The online appendix documents
that our earnings measure and aggregate measures of wages move almost one to one, and that the behavior of hours
worked is likely not an important source of the cycle variation of earnings in Germany.
41This group is informative about the cyclicality of earnings because if repeated annual collective bargaining about
earnings is very prevalent in Germany, earnings of continuously employed will follow the same cyclical pattern as
earnings in overall labor market. It also addresses concerns regarding job composition over the cycle raised by Gertler
and Trigari (2009) given that no transitions occur.
26
approach is the fact that that no transition occurs might be endogenous so the selected group might
not be very representative. In a second approach we follow Bils (1985) by estimating individual
earnings growth equations to difference out fixed effects. This rules out that observable composition
effects affect average earnings growth rates over time. The last earnings reported for unemployed
workers though might be a long period of time ago, possibly biasing our estimates. In a final
approach we construct an earnings index following Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007). They
propose to run a first stage regression of earnings on individual controls and to use the residuals of
the regression for the index construction separately for all labor market transitions averaging over
residuals in the cross-section.42
Table 9 shows the results. Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) report earning elasticities for
newly employed workers around 0.8 and for stayer of around 0.4 for the U.S. In Germany we obtain
an elasticity estimate roughly between 0.5− 0.8 across all methods and subgroups used. The point
estimates of the different methods controlling for selection give conflicting evidence on the question
whether earnings for newly employed workers are more or less rigid than earnings for continuously
employed. Overall the different subgroups seem to behave similarly over the cycle in line with
union wage arrangements that apply to all workers in a particular industry. However, given the
large confidence bands, we can not rule out the possibility that German earnings are more or less
rigid compared to the U.S. We therefore turn briefly to a theoretical exploration.
Table 9: earnings elasticities
EE UE stay cont. empl.
index 0.69 0.53 0.68 0.80
s.e. 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.25
growth 0.33 0.86 0.66 0.62
s.e. 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.15
correlation 0.60 0.42 0.49 0.52
Notes: Annual earnings elasticities for full-time employed workers. index refers to the earnings index (mean) using
a first difference filter. growth refers to the estimation using individual growth rates. All elasticities are for annual
changes and with respect to productivity (GDP p. empl.).
42We refer for details of the estimation procedure and a variety of robustness checks to the online appendix
accompanying this paper.
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5.3.2 Theoretical Exploration of Wage Rigidities
While the micro-foundations on the form of wage rigidities differ substantially across papers43, the
basic mechanism is similar: making wages rigid over the cycle increases firm profits in a boom more
than proportional, so the percentage change in firm profits is amplified and in turn the UE rate
volatility increases. We capture this effects using a countercyclical outside payment b exp(ϕ(x)a)
with ϕ(x) < 0.44 Conditioning on the tenure status we can make wages for different subgroups, i.e.
newly employed worker or continuously employed workers, rigid to a different degree.
We use the same calibration strategy as before with the exception that we now target a benefit
to output ratio of 80%, which we call a ’large surplus’ calibration.45 We then use ϕ = −2.9 to
generate the UE volatility observed in the data.46 We still target a wage elasticity of 0.8 initially,
so the bargaining power for the U.S. has to increase substantially. Compared to the benchmark
calibration the total surplus of a match increases but average profits accruing to firms remain small
due to the large bargaining power of workers. Together with the countercyclical reaction of benefits
the model is able to generate large UE rate volatilities despite a substantial decline in the level of
the outside option.
Table 10 shows again the results for the calibrated U.S. economy in the upper part together with the
data targets for the U.S. and Germany. The lower part again comprises the parameter experiments.
The first experiment reproduces the outcomes for a change in the matching efficiency. We see the
same picture emerging as in the the last section suggesting that our results are not driven by the
small surplus calibration. The second experiment shows a change in the outside option consistent
with a decline in the average UE rate. If larger benefits were the main driver in explaining the
average UE rate differences we would need a large increase in the outside option given that the
underlying elasticities changed Costain and Reiter (2008). At the same time, the impact on the
volatilities is comparable to the baseline model. A similar argument applies to all other parameters
discussed in section 4.
Making wages more (less) rigid in the third (fourth) experiment has the effect of increasing (decreas-
ing) both the UE rate as well as the EU rate volatility in our model leaving the ratio, and therefore,
43Hall and Milgrom (2008), Shimer (2005), Rudanko (2009) and Elsby and Michaels (2010) among others propose
different rationales and/or micro-foundations for these wage rigidities. The interesting mechanism in Elsby and
Michaels (2010) for example differentiates between the marginal wage and the average wage. Firms with decreasing
returns to scale take the impact on the average wage of an additional marginal hire into account. An extra worker
in a boom not only adds to output, but reduces average wages, making profits more pro-cyclical. This mechanism
though seems less appealing for Germany, where industry wide wage arrangements imply that a firm accepts wage
changes for all of their workers and their hiring decision has no impact on the wages paid to other workers at the
same firm.
44One way to think about this are extensions in the duration of benefit payments in a recession as has been recently
observed in the United States.
45The number is taken from Elsby and Michaels (2010) who generate this outside option endogenously in a model
with decreasing returns to scale, endogenous separation and a wage bargaining mechanism that differentiated the
marginal wage and the average wage paid. Hall and Milgrom (2008) argue for a similar number.
46This results for the U.S. economy in the following parameters κ = 0.06, κ = 0.52, µ = 0.91, ψ = 1.8, b
w
= 0.8,
and τ = 5.15.
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Table 10: Experiments
pieu,L pieu,M pieu,H piue σ˜ue σ˜eu,L σ˜eu,M σ˜eu,H σw
U.S. (Data) 3.55 1.68 0.8 30.6 11.2 - - - 0.8
U.S. (Model) 3.55 1.68 0.8 30.6 11.2 4.4 6.3 7.7 0.8
GER (Data) 1.3 0.4 0.2 6.2 10.5 18.4 23.0 23.4 0.8
(1) κ = 0.11 1.0 0.35 0.15 6.2 11.5 19.3 22.3 24.1 0.76
(2) b/w = 0.97 4.8 2.5 1.3 6.2 146 12.0 13.4 17.2 0.82
(3) ϕ = −14.5 3.6 1.7 0.8 30.6 38.6 14.9 19.4 22.5 0.47
(4) ϕ = −1.45 3.6 1.7 0.8 30.6 7.3 2.9 4.3 5.6 0.85
(5)
ϕL = −13.6
3.6 1.7 0.8 30.6 46.2 18.1 3.6 4.7 0.77
(ϕM , ϕH) =
−2.9
(6)
ϕL = −2.9
3.6 1.7 0.8 30.6 9.2 3.4 20.5 23.7 0.5
(ϕM , ϕH) =
−13.6
Notes: The upper part reports the data. The lower part reports the experiments. piEU,L, piEU,M and piEU,H denotes
the EU-rate for low (medium, high) tenured worker averaged over all idiosyncratic skill levels. The same applies for
σ˜EU,..
the decomposition of the unemployment volatility almost unaffected. If wage rigidities affect the
surplus they will, in a model with endogenous separation, also affect the EU rate volatility.
The fifth experiment looks at wage rigidities that only affect newly employed workers, i.e. we make
wages for low tenured jobs more rigid. We see that this channel will increase the EU rate volatility
for low tenured workers, but also the UE rate volatility. However, the EU rate volatility is reduced
for high tenured workers, which is counterfactual. The last experiment reverts the argument and
makes wages for medium and high tenured worker’s more rigid, while leaving the wage rigidity for
low tenured workers at their U.S. value. We see that although the EU rate volatility increases for
high tenured workers the price to pay would be an EU rate volatility that is substantially too low
for low tenured workers.
Our findings imply that there is a tight connection between a version of rigid wages and the EU
rate volatility. Subgroups of workers, i.e. newly employed workers, which might have a different
wage elasticity would in our model also experience a different behavior of the separation decision
compared to workers who were continuously employed. Our data on the uniform increase in the
EU rate volatility by tenure and our empirical finding of a similar wage elasticity across subgroups
though suggests that differences in wage rigidities are likely not the prime driving force for the
U.S.-German cross country differences in the second moments.
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6 Conclusions
We document in this paper large differences in the average transition rates and the behavior of
the EU rate volatility in Germany in comparison to the U.S. The second moments of the data
offer identification restrictions that help to disentangle the importance of institutional factors in
explaining the large cross-country differences in the first moments. We show that some of the usual
’suspects’ for the transatlantic division, employment protection, union bargaining or the benefit
system are likely not the main driving force of the observed differences. We traced the differences
between Germany and the U.S. back to one factor, namely inefficiencies in the matching process.
Matching inefficiencies in our model capture, in a reduced form sense, frictions in the entry process
of creating new positions. Our findings suggest that understanding the details of this labor market
friction in a more micro-founded way will be a quantitatively important factor in understanding
the cross-country differences in labor markets and in the transmission of shocks.
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A Appendix
A.1 Unemployment decomposition
We describe here briefly the decomposition proposed in Fujita and Ramey (2009) and our extension.
The decomposition of Fujita and Ramey is a two state, two transition rates decomposition. The
idea of the decomposition of the unemployment volatility into contribution rates from EU and UE
flows is to take an approximation around trend unemployment
ut ≈
pieu,t
pieu,t + piue,t
log
(
ut
u¯t
)
= (1− u¯t) log
(
piue,t
p¯iue,t
)
− (1− u¯t) log
(
pieu,t
p¯ieu,t
)
+ t
dut = dUEt + dEUt + t
where pieu,t denotes the EU rate and piue,t is the UE rate. A bar denotes the trend component of
the respective variable. log (ut/u¯t) measures the relative deviation of the unemployment rate from
its trend.
Fujita and Ramey (2009) show that the variance of ln(ut/u¯t) can then be decomposed such that
1 = βpiue + βpieu + β where βx =
cov(dut,dpix)
var(dut)
. Their decomposition allows us to obtain two separate
components (and an error term) for the importance of the respective series in explaining the cyclical
variation of the unemployment rate. Using an equivalent steady state approximation for the three
state case and defining weights α := p¯inu
p¯ine+p¯inu
and λij := (1− u¯)
p¯iij
p¯iu
, as well as the (weighted) average
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of separation and hiring rates p¯iu := p¯ieu +
p¯inu
p¯ine+p¯inu
p¯ien and p¯ie := p¯iue +
p¯iun
p¯ine+p¯inu
p¯ine, we obtain an
extended decomposition
log
(ut
u¯
)
= log
(
pieu,t
p¯ieu
)
λeu − log
(
piue,t
p¯iue
)
λue
+ log
(
pien,t
p¯ien
)
αλen − log
(
pine,t
p¯ine
)
(1− α)(λue + λun − λeu)
+ log
(
pinu,t
p¯inu
)
α(λeu + λen − λue)− log
(
piun,t
p¯iun
)
(1− α)λun + εt
dut = dEUt + dUEt + dENt + dNEt + dNUt + dUNt + εt
Using again βx =
cov(dut,dpix)
var(dut)
a similar covariance decomposition as in Fujita and Ramey (2009) of
the form 1 =
∑n
i=1 βi + εt applies.
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A.2 Data
A.2.1 Data description
The data is taken from the IAB regional files that cover the period from January 1975 to December
2004. The data consists of daily employment records of workers that have been employed for at
least one day in a job under mandatory social security. The dataset comprises a 2% representative
subsample of workers drawn from these records. Once an individual has been put into the sample,
the full employment history of this individual during the sampling period is observed. The em-
ployment history consists of employment spells that are subject to mandatory social security and
unemployment spells where social security benefits have been paid. The sample therefore does not
contain spells in public service (’Beamte’ ), self-employment, and periods of inactivity. We describe
below in detail how we control for these periods by constructing artifical spells. Still, the data
covers about 80% of the German workforce.
A.2.2 Sampling period and sample selection
Due to measurement problems in unemployment during the years 1977 and 1978 we use the first
five years (1975 − 1979) only as a pre-sample and start our main analysis in 1980.
In a first step sample selection, we drop all individuals where the East-West information is miss-
ing (2, 787 individuals dropped) or information regarding the current job48 (14, 490 individuals
dropped). Furthermore, we drop homeworkers (’Heimarbeiter’) from the sample (7, 315 individuals
47The formula is similar to the first difference filter obtained in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008), though they
essentially lump together the rates dENt + dUNt and the corresponding inflow rate into dNEt + dNUt. In fact the
inactivity flows are hard to interpret in their decomposition. It is important to note that the decomposition does
not rely on knowing the state of non-employed workers, which is not available for Germany but that only the (gross)
flows are needed. A detailed derivation is available upon request.
48stib information missing.
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dropped). This results in a dropping rate of 1.81% for the whole sample, and leaves us with a
sample of employment histories for 1, 336, 357 individuals. After the German reunification the data
contains employment histories with spells that are located in East Germany. Since the East Ger-
man labor market was subject to additional regulations and restructuring after the reunification,
we exclude in a second step all persons with employment spells in the East from our sample. This
leaves us with a final sample of 1, 087, 555 individuals. From these records we drop all marginal
employment spells to avoid mismeasurement because marginal employment spells are only reported
for the last five years of the sample period.
A.2.3 Construction of monthly employment histories
The employment history is given as a collection of employment spells on a daily basis. A new
spell can either occur due to administrative reasons of the social security system or changes within
a given firm. Importantly for our analysis, every change of employers or the beginning of an
unemployment or a inactivity spell is recorded in the data. Regularly, individuals have periods of
parallel employment in the sample. This is reported as multiple spells. For every spell, we observe
whether it is full-time, part-time, or starting in 1999 marginal employment We apply a hierarchical
ordering to classify these spells.49
Our basic time-period is one month. We adopt the ILO timing convention to measure the em-
ployment status of a person in a given month. For each month we determine the Monday of the
second week in the month and take the week starting from this Monday as our reference week. We
look at all spells that overlap with this week. If only one spell overlaps, then this spell determines
the labor market status in the current month. If several spells overlap, we again use a hierarchical
ordering of spells50 From this classification of monthly employment states, we construct time-series
at monthly frequency. To check whether a person stays with the same employer, we use the es-
tablishment number of the employment spells. This implies that a transition of a person between
establishments but within the same firm is counted as a job-to-job transition. The definition of
who is counted as unemployed follows from the content of the dataset. A person is unemployed if
she receives unemployment benefits or other benefits on the basis of the Social Security Code III
(’Sozialgestzbuch III’). We can not follow the ILO definition that is based on interview questions
49If persons have parallel spells in their employment history, we consider only what we call primary spells. The
idea is to consider the employment spell that generates the most income and occupies the most working time of an
individual. To identify the primary spell, we apply a hierarchical selection procedure. If a person is simultaneously
employed full-time and part-time, we label him or her as full-time employed and drop the part-time spells, if a
person has two part-time employments, we follow the ordering in the dataset that applies a hierarchical ordering
based on income and part-time status over parallel spells, finally, if a person has simultaneously employment and
unemployment spells, we label the employment spells as primary to be consistent with the procedure in the next
step of determining the employment status.This problem only arises with marginal employment and can therefore be
disregarded for the analysis in this paper.
50A full-time employment spell dominates part-time spells and any employment spell trumps unemployment or
inactivity spells.
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on job search and willingness to take up employment because this is unobservable in our sample.
We label inactive employment that is reported in the dataset as currently not working. These spells
are periods of sustained employment relationships which are currently inactive, i.e. the worker does
not work and no income is paid. Examples for these periods are maternity leave, long periods of
illness, or sabbaticals. We construct additional inactivity spells as residual spells in the dataset.
The additional spells are included if a person is not observed in the sample for some time period
between two spells. To deal with persons entering the sample or dropping out of the sample, we
introduce additional labor market states that we label labor market entry and retirement.51
A.2.4 Earnings
The earnings reported at one spell is the average daily earnings of an individual during the em-
ployment spell52. We do not observe hours worked but observe whether the person is full-time,
part-time, or from 1999 on in marginal employment. We use earnings of the primary spell for
the analysis in this paper. We deflate earnings using the annual German CPI obtained from the
Bundesbank. We adjust observed earnings in the sample along two dimensions, we impute earn-
ings below and above the social security thresholds following Gartner (2005) and we adjust for the
change in earnings reporting in 1983 following Fitzenberger (1999). An extensive discussion about
the methods can be found in the online appendix.
A.2.5 Aggregate data
Our GDP measure for Germany is GDP per capita. We use GDP per capita because of the large
inflows to West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall but before the official reunification.
To obtain productivity, we divide by the number of employed persons. The time series for West
Germany at quarterly frequency are only available until 1992Q4 afterwards only GDP series for
Germany are available at a quarterly frequency. We merge the two series in 1992Q4 and run an
ARIMA X-12 outlier correction on the combined series. The outlier correction controls for additive
outlier, temporary, and permanent shifts in the data. The earnings series for Germany are median
earnings of full-time employed workers from our dataset. We deflate all series using the CPI.
The unemployment rates for Germany are available at monthly frequency for West Germany and
we aggregate to quarterly frequency by taking quarterly averages of monthly rates. GDP, GDP
51The labor market entry state is an artificial state that we add before the first employment state. The retirement
state is an artificial state at the end of the labor market history. We assign it to persons that are 55 or older when
they have their last observed spell. The retirement state is by construction an absorbing state and persons that enter
will be dropped from the analysis one month later. Persons that are below 55 and have no future spells in the sample
are labeled as other employment and are no longer considered after the transition into this inactivity state, i.e. they
do not generate transitions out of inactivity. Persons that are below 55 but have future spells are labeled as out of
the labor force. The labor market entry state, the reported spells of inactivity, and the out of the labor force spells
constitute the pool from which all inactivity transitions originate.
52The working period is not adjusted for weekends or holidays.
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per employed (productivity), earnings, and unemployment rates for the U.S. have been obtained
from the bureau of labor statistics (BLS). Except for the EE rates that have been obtained from
Fallick and Fleischman (2004) all data on transition rates has been obtained from Shimer (2007).
The transition rates by tenure groups for the U.S. are authors’ calculations. We rely on irregular
supplements to the CPS that report information on tenure with the current employer. These are
the Occupational Mobility and Job Tenure supplements for the years 1983, 1987, 1991, 1996, 1998,
2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. We link the supplement information to the basic monthly data files
as described in Shimer (2007). Using the linked monthly files, we construct gross flow rates by
tenure for the nine months where tenure information is available. The reported transition rates
are time averages. Due to the rotation of the panel and the point in time information on tenure
in the CPS, we report only transition rates in the month where tenure is available. U.S. transition
rates are adjusted for seasonal effects and time aggregation to match their unconditional averages.
The transition rates for Germany are constructed using the employment histories that have been
constructed from the IAB panel. All data that is generated based on our own calculations is
seasonally adjusted at a monthly frequency using the X-12 ARIMA method.
A.3 Data details
A.3.1 Imputation method for censored earnings
Earnings in the sample are top-coded at the upper contribution limit (’Beitragsbemessungsgrenze’)
of the German social security system, and bottom-coded at the marginal employment contribution
level (’Geringfuegigkeitsgrenze’). For some of the steps in the analysis we need an uncensored
earnings distribution. For these steps we impute earnings above and below the two censoring points
using the method proposed in Gartner (2005). The same approach is used in Dustmann, Ludsteck,
and Scho¨nberg (2009) who use the previous vintage of the same dataset. The method runs a Tobit
regression on log earnings. As controls, we use a fourth order polynomial in potential experience,
a sex dummy, a foreigner dummy, and education dummies for the three groups of low, medium,
and high education. We run the regression separately for each year and each employment state
(full-time, two part-time states, and apprenticeship). We impute earnings under the assumption
of a normally distributed error term. This assumption is also used in Dustmann, Ludsteck, and
Scho¨nberg (2009) who do an extensive sensitivity analysis to this specification.
A.3.2 Correction for structural breaks
Starting in 1984 the earnings data also includes overtime and bonus payments. We correct for
this structural break using the method proposed in Fitzenberger (1999). His procedure leaves the
median and all observations below the median unchanged and corrects earnings observations only
above the median. The approach is based on measuring the excess growth of the upper earnings
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quantiles between 1983 and 1984. It corrects all earnings before 1984 if observed earnings in 1984
are in the upper half of the earnings distrinution using an adjustment factor that is a combination
of the excess growth rate from 1983 to 1984 and the quantile position at that point in time. For
further details see Fitzenberger (1999).
A.3.3 Measurement error
For variables regarding the job status, earnings, or the duration of the job the data contains
virtually no measurement error because it is taken from the social security records that are used to
determine social security contributions and benefits. The personal characteristics that we observe
with every spell, such as year of birth, education, industry, and location of the employer may,
however, contain measurement error. Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and R.Voelter (2006) point out
that the education variable may be subject to higher measurement error and provide imputation
and correction rules for this variable. We adopt their imputation and correction procedure and
determine the highest attained education level of an individual over the employment history to
group persons into education groups. The low education group comprises all individuals with no
vocational training, the medium education group all individuals with vocational training or high-
school (’Abitur’) but no vocational training, and high-school and vocational training, and the high
education group all individuals with technical college degree or university degree. The variable year
of birth is censored for all observations in the employment history, if a person is at at least one
spell below 16 or older than 62.53 In the first case, we set year of birth as if the person is 15 at the
first spell and in the second case as if the person is 63 at the last spell. We recover age at all spells
consistently.
A.4 Labor market transition rates
Table 11 gives the transition rates for males and females and table 12 gives transition rates by
education levels. For a definition of the different education groups see A.3.3.
Table 13 gives the cyclical properties of employment outflow rates for different tenure classes in
Germany. Since we observe the U.S. data only at a limited set of points in time, we can not provide
reasonable statistics for the U.S.. Most importantly and discussed in the main text the volatility
of EU rates is always larger than the unconditional EU rate for the U.S. and is increasing across
tenure classes. Table 14 reports the cyclical properties of the outflow rates from inactivity. For
Germany the mean rates are given in brackets because in our dataset we do not observe the whole
universe of persons in inactivity. The cyclical properties align with the U.S. counterparts especially
regarding the correlation with GDP.
53Due to the sample length both cases can not occur simultaneously.
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Table 11: Labor market transition rates by sex
sex mean std corr.
EU
Males 0.6 18.5 −0.81
Females 0.5 10.5 −0.76
EN
Males 0.9 7.3 0.52
Females 1.1 5.9 0.48
UE
Males 6.8 11.7 0.36
Females 5.4 10.4 0.59
UN
Males 4.4 11.4 0.48
Females 5.6 9.5 0.28
EE
Males 0.9 15.6 0.61
Females 0.9 16.1 0.68
Notes: Transition rates and standard deviations are given as percentages. Correlations give the correlation coefficient
with GDP.
A.5 Unemployment decomposition
Table 15 provides the decomposition of the unemployment volatility based on the decomposition
proposed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008). This decomposition includes transitions from and
to inactivity (not in the labor force) but does not allow to separate the contributions of EN and
NU flows from the contribution of UN and NE flows.
Table 16 provides the decomposition for different subgroups using the decomposition proposed by
Fujita and Ramey (2009) and our extension to the three state case.
A.6 Earnings cyclicality
A.6.1 Estimation
If transitions from employment to unemployment and vice versa over the business cycle do not
uniformly occur over all groups of workers the composition of the characteristics of employed
workers changes over the business cycle. For example, it might be the case that during a recession
especially low-skilled, i.e. with lower education, or younger workers account for the increasing flow
from employment to unemployment. In this case we should expect that average earnings resp.
wages of the group that remains employed rises mechanically because average worker quality rises.
This composition bias would bias earnings resp. wages upward in recessions. Similarly, during
a boom the average worker quality might decrease because now the lower skilled and/or younger
workers make up for a large share of the unemployment to employment flows so that average
earnings resp. wages are now biased downward for all employed. In total, this composition bias
might lead to less comovement of aggregate series over the business cycle than it is the case at the
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Table 12: Labor market transition rates by education
education mean std corr.
EU
low 0.5 13.8 −0.60
medium 0.5 16.2 −0.83
high 0.4 12.5 −0.53
EN
low 1.4 9.0 0.37
medium 0.9 6.1 0.59
high 1.1 12.6 0.17
UE
low 3.4 14.5 0.42
medium 6.8 10.2 0.41
high 6.6 11.7 0.52
UN
low 5.2 12.0 0.23
medium 4.8 10.5 0.50
high 5.5 9.2 0.23
EE
low 0.5 19.4 0.56
medium 0.9 15.5 0.67
high 1.1 14.1 0.50
Notes: Transition rates for all workers. Transition rates and standard deviations are given as percentages. Correlations
give the correlation coefficient with GDP.
individual level.54 Next, we describe several approaches to control for the composition bias that
have been proposed in the literature and that we apply to obtain the estimates reported in the
main paper.
Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) use a group selection procedure to fix the group of individuals
in order to avoid changes in the composition over time. We follow their approach and identify
ongoing job relations that exist not just on a year-to-year basis but over the whole sample period.
This constitutes a particularly homogeneous subpanel of workers, namely those who had a job in
1975 and were continuously employed full-time at the same firm until 2004. In other words, for this
group, we ensure that no EE transition and no EU transition happened during their entire work
experience.55 For this group we only have earnings information at annual frequency. Although the
group of continuously employed workers is highly selective, it allows us to examine the earnings
dynamics of very stable jobs. The selection procedure addresses, therefore, concerns regarding job
quality over the cycle raised by Gertler and Trigari (2009). We consider this group to be especially
informative because if collective union bargaining is important for individual earnings in Germany,
54Since the composition bias results from changes in the workforce composition over the business cycle, the bias
should be increasing in the transition rates between labor market states. Given that transition rates for Germany
are lower by a factor of 4− 5, we expect the composition effect to be lower for Germany. This is also suggested by a
comparison of the correlation of earnings with GDP for the U.S. and Germany in table 1 in the main text.
55The group still consists of approximately 5, 969 workers and is therefore large enough to provide reasonable
estimates.
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Table 13: Transition rates by tenure over the business cycle over the period 1980 − 2004
tenure in
years
< 1 1− 2 2− 5 > 5
EU
mean 1.8 0.7 0.4 0.2
std 19.6 17.4 23.0 23.4
rel. share 58.5 13.5 14.6 13.5
corr −0.77 −0.74 −0.73 −0.57
EE
mean 1.8 1.1 0.8 0.4
std 12.0 15.9 17.4 14.6
rel. share 41.7 15.1 21.8 21.5
corr 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.51
EN
mean 1.9 0.6 0.4 0.2
std 11.4 13.5 15.6 17.2
rel. share 59.4 10.7 15.3 14.7
corr 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.27
Notes: Tenure categories are given in years. All transition rates are given as percentages of the workers in the
respective tenure group and are averages over time. Only workers in full-time employment are considered. Standard
deviations are given as percentage deviations from trend of the rates (in logs). Correlations give the correlation
coefficient with GDP.
then this group should obey the same cyclical pattern as other groups yet it will not be affected by
the described composition bias. We report estimates of earnings elasticities for this group for each
of the two methods proposed below. Furthermore, we run a regression directly on median earnings.
Since this group is not affected by composition bias, the estimates should be the same as for the
methods where we control for the composition bias.
As a second correctional approach, we follow Bils (1985) and estimate individual earnings growth
equations using first differences to control for individual specific fixed effects. This approach might
be restrictive if only a short panel dimension is available. In particular, we do not observe last
earnings of unemployed workers. We overcome this problem by exploiting the panel dimension.
We keep track of last earnings of unemployed workers and use them as a proxy for unobserved
earnings in the regressions. We construct a sample comprising all spells with certain labor market
transitions, e.g. UE transitions. For this sample we regress individual earnings growth for the
particular labor market event on several individual control variables and productivity growth. We
include a constant in the earnings growth regression. This constant captures the initial level effect
after reemployment Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993); Burda and Mertens (2001). We
perform a sensitivity check with respect to the length of the unemployment spell and the previous
employment spell for EE transitions below. The labor market events are grouped by years, and
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Table 14: Inactivity transition rates over the business cycle
Statistic Transition
rate
mean std corr
Germany
NE
(6.5) 9.4 0.49
U.S. 4.2 5.9 0.64
Germany
NU
(2.3) 8.5 -0.47
U.S. 3.6 7.1 -0.58
Notes: Mean transition rates for Germany are given in brackets because the pool of inactive workers is not observed
in the dataset. Standard deviations are given as percentage deviations from trend of the rates (in logs). Correlations
give the correlation coefficient with GDP.
Table 15: Unemployment decomposition sensitivity to filter choice
Country Data EU UE NU + EN UN + NE ε
Germany
IAB (∆) 49.0 51.0 0
IAB (∆) 34.6 28.4 20.6 16.4 0.0
IAB (HP) 42.5 24.6 −2.7 31.0 −0.3
U.S.
Shimer (∆) 64.3 35.7 0.0
Fujita/Ramey (∆) 51.7 48.3 0.0
Shimer (∆) 40.1 30.5 12.1 17.3 0.0
Shimer (HP) 20.1 48.6 6.6 24.0 0.7
Notes: Data period 1980q1−2004q4. For Germany the transition rates are for all workers. The U.S. data is obtained
from Shimer (2007) and Fujita and Ramey (2009). Contribution shares are given as percentage numbers. (∆) denotes
the cases where a 1st difference filter has been used. HP refers to the cases where a HP-Filter (λ = 100, 000) has
been used.
individual controls are a fourth order polynomial in potential labor market experience, dummies
for sex, three education groups, and for foreigners. We also include a time-trend.
Although, the panel dimension of our dataset allows us to overcome missing pre-employment earn-
ings for UE transitions, there might still be concerns regarding this approach. To overcome potential
concerns, we follow Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) who propose a wage index construction.
They propose to control for observable characteristics like age, sex, education, and experience and
to focus on the behavior of the residual. We follow their procedure and construct earnings indices
for UE, EE, persons who stayed at the same firm throughout the year (stayer), and for the group
of continuously employed workers described above. We use the same controls as in the individual
earnings growth regression.
A.6.2 Results
Results are given in 9 in the main text. The elasticity estimates for the group of continuously
employed workers is 0.80 if we consider the earnings index and 0.62 in the regression using individual
growth rates. If we regress the growth rate of median (mean) earnings of this group directly on
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Table 16: Unemployment decomposition for different groups
Sample EU UE NE EN NU UN ε
males
64.3 35.4 0.3
45.7 24.9 16.9 −4.1 8.3 8.4 −0.1
females
49.4 50.3 0.3
33.5 28.0 25.4 −4.6 3.7 14.5 −0.3
low skilled
48.0 51.9 0.1
29.2 26.8 31.6 −3.2 7.9 7.9 −0.2
medium skilled
63.7 35.9 0.3
45.0 23.8 18.1 −4.5 7.1 10.8 −0.2
high skilled
51.7 48.2 0.1
36.5 26.2 20.9 −1.0 6.7 10.3 0.4
Notes: Contribution of labor market transitions to unemployment fluctuations. Data is detrended using the HP-filter
(λ = 100, 000) for the period 1980q1 − 2004q3.
productivity without correction for composition bias, we find an elasticity of 0.81(0.75) in line with
hypothesis that there is no composition bias for this group. Table 17 provides a sensitivity check for
estimates for the earnings elasticity of EU and EE transitions from the earnings growth regression.
For EE transitions we consider only transitions out of jobs that lasted for a certain minimum
number of days (column 1). For UE transitions we only include transitions that take place before a
maximum number of days in unemployment (column 3). The exclusion of particularly short (long)
employment (unemployment) spells, allows us to focus on homogeneous transitions that are not
affected by composition effects in the spell duration before the transition. Different length of spell
duration before the transition could be correlated with unobserved worker quality or in the case
of a transition out of employment with the quality of the match or in case of a transition out of
unemployment with the amount of depreciated human capital. We see that for the EE transitions
the estimate is unaffected while it increases slightly if the considered transitions include also longer
unemployment spells.
In table 18, we run the regression of individual growth rates using a least absolute deviations (LAD)
estimation to reduce the influence of outliers on the earnings elasticity estimate. The estimates
for workers staying on the job remain unaffected while for UE transitions the focus on the median
decreases the estimate slightly while it increases it for the EE transitions.
In table 19, we use instead of first differencing the data the HP filter to obtain the cyclical component
of the earnings index. The estimated elasticities increase slightly.
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Table 17: Sensitivity of earnings elasticity to tenure and unemployment duration
min(E) EE max(U) UE
30
33.6
30
63.2
(11.6) (19.3)
90
37.8
60
70.3
(12.0) (17.6)
180
38.1
90
69.2
(13.1) (16.3)
360
39.0
120
67.8
(12.9) (16.6)
720
36.0
180
72.4
(13.1) (17.5)
1080
30.4
240
75.8
(12.3) (18.7)
1440
33.5
300
75.2
(12.3) (20.1)
1800
36.0
360
76.0
(13.3) (21.1)
Notes: Annual earnings elasticity from individual earnings growth equation for job-to-job movers (EE) and job finder
(UE). min(E) gives the minimum days of tenure before the job-to-job transition for the transition to be considered.
max(U) gives the maximum unemployment duration in days before the transition to employment for the transition
to be considered. Standard errors are clustered by years.
Table 18: Earnings elasticities using LAD
EE UE stay cont. stay
LAD 0.48 0.68 0.64 0.62
s.e. 0.12 0.23 0.13 0.19
Notes: Annual earnings elasticities for full-time employed workers. Earnings elasticities are estimated using a least
absolute deviations (LAD). Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered by years.
Table 19: Earnings elasticities using the HP-Filter
EE UE stay cont. stay
91.3 63.8 68.1 88.7
s.e. 18.7 22.2 23.3 26.3
corr 0.71 0.51 0.52 0.58
Notes: Earnings elasticities using the earnings index and the HP filter (λ = 100, 000).
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A.7 Analytic elasticities
In the paper, we report analytic approximations for the elasticities of p¯ieu, p¯iue, σ˜eu, and σ˜ue. Here
we give the exact analytic expressions. We use η(x, p) to denote the elasticity of expression x with
respect to parameter p. To ease readability, we use the following shorthand expressions
Σ = 1− β + β
(
pieu +
µ
%
piue
)
Ψ¯ = ψ ((1− pieu) log(1− pieu) + pieu log(pieu))
η (pieu, κ) = −
β2µS (pieu − 1) (%− 1) piue
Σψ%
η (piue, κ) =
%− 1
%
+
βµ(%− 1)2piue
Σ %2
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β2µS (µ− %) (pieu − 1) piue
Σψ% (µ− 1)
η (piue, µ) =
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−
µ (%− 1)
% (µ− 1)
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−
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ψΣ
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Σ%S
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Σ%S
η (pieu, τ) =
τ (pieu − 1) (Σ− βpieu)
Σψ
η (piue, τ) =
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Σ%S
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1
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−
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Σ%
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